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Hints, not Holdings: Use of Precedent
in Lawrence v. Texas
David M. Wagner∗

I. INTRODUCTION
The way the Supreme Court tells the story, Lawrence v. Texas1 was
merely an inevitable and long-overdue piece of housecleaning. Bowers v.
Hardwick,2 we are told, was an outlier in a long string of cases
establishing the constitutional sacredness of sexual conduct and its
sequelae, and Lawrence merely removed the anomaly.3 That
constitutional spring supposedly finds its headwaters at Meyer v.
Nebraska,4 and flows from there into the wide river of Planned

This paper was presented at “The Future of Marriage and Claims for Same-Sex Unions Symposium”
on August 29, 2003 at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, on the campus of Brigham Young
University. The article is part of this special symposium issue and the views expressed herein are
those of the author and do not represent the views of the Journal of Public Law, the J. Reuben Clark
Law School, or Brigham Young University.
∗
MA, JD, Associate Professor, Regent University School of Law. The author wishes to thank his
research assistant, Sarah Carver; Prof. Lynn Wardle and the J. Reuben Clark School of Law at
Brigham Young University, where a draft of this paper was given; and William Duncan and the
Marriage Law Project, cosponsors of that conference and unfailing sources of encouragement.
1. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick).
2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the Due Process right to privacy does not encompass a
right to homosexual sodomy ).
3. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480 (the Court states, “the historical grounds relied upon in
Bowers are more complex than the majority opinion and the concurring opinion indicate. Their
historical premises are not without doubt and, at the very least, are overstated.” The Court tries to
show the inaccuracies and misconceptions of the Bowers court and states, “the sweeping references
by Chief Burger to the history of Western civilization . . . did not take account of other
authorities . . .” id. at 2481.)
4. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that 14th Amendment Due Process protects the right of an
elementary school language teacher to pursue his calling without undue government hindrance. Two
years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Meyer decision was interpreted
to imply a right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. Since the 1960s these two
decisions have been treated as the origin of the constitutional right to “privacy” in matters of
intimate relationships). See also Lawrence at 2476 (discussing the “broad statements of the
substantive reach of liberty under the Due Process Clause in earlier cases.”) (emphasis added). The
Lawrence Court then cites to Meyer. Lawrence at 2481 (discussing two principal cases decided after
Bowers that cast its holding into “even more doubt.” These two principal cases are Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).)
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Parenthood v. Casey,5 building a lake of Fourteenth Amendmentprotected personal autonomy, whether expressed in terms of privacy,6
liberty,7 or simply due process.8
This narrative, however, is substantially fictional. The early cases in
the standard “privacy” string-cite protect a zone of bourgeois, lawabiding normality, not a zone of personal self-definition.9 The later cases,
beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut,10 protect a right of personal
decision-making with regard to one issue, namely, whether to become
parents. Meanwhile, more recent cases, such as Michael H. v. Gerald
D.11 and Washington v. Glucksberg,12 establish that (outside the sui
generis category of abortion), an analysis based on “history and
tradition” still governs whenever the Court is called upon to protect
fundamental rights not previously recognized as such.13
This alternative, tradition-driven narrative, it must be admitted,
emerges from the cases only if one reads them in light of what they
actually say. If one reads them instead as cultural signals, as hints of
things much broader than their holdings, then, of course, their
interpretation is also uncertain. So too is the rule of law, for two reasons:
(1) the Court is utterly unpredictable if it develops its doctrine based on
hints rather than holdings, and (2) the rights developed from the hints
rather than the holdings, culminating in the Casey “mystery passage”,14

5. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding a right to abortion on the grounds that individuals must
decide for themselves their “own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life”). Id. at 851.
6. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
7. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
8. See Meyer, 262 U.S. 390.
9. See infra, notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
10. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that various ‘emanations from penumbras’ of
Constitutional text create a ‘right of privacy’ that in turn creates a right of married couples to use
contraceptives).
11. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (using a history-and-tradition analysis to deny the claim that a
biological father has a substantive due process right to assert parental rights over a child whose legal
parents accept her and hold her forth as their own). The Michael H. Court citing Griswold states, in a
plurality opinion, also stated, “Our cases reflect ‘continual insistence upon respect for the teachings
of history [and] solid recognition.’” Therefore, the Court’s language supports the proposition of the
author. Id. at 122.
12. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). The Washington Court stated, “We begin, as we do in all dueprocess cases, by examining our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices.” Id. at 710.
13. In Michael H., the right claimed was that of an adulterous natural father to assert parental
rights over a child, over the objections of both the natural mother and her husband, who was the
child’s adopted father. 491 U.S. 110. In Glucksberg, the right claimed was the asserted right to
physician-assisted suicide. 521 U.S. 702. Both claims failed, as being insufficiently rooted in
American legal history and tradition to merit the status of “fundamental” and hence enforceable by
the judiciary over the legislatures.
14. “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
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are so broad that they would devour the rule of law if taken seriously, as
Lawrence takes them.15
Part II of this article examines the parental rights cases on which
Lawrence relied, comparing their actual holdings and dicta with the
interpretations given to those holdings and dicta in later cases. Part III
similarly examines the contraception and abortion cases on which
Lawrence relied. Part IV explains and defends my assertions about
Casey, Lawrence, and the rule of law. Part V will conclude this article by
examining the implications of Lawrence for the issue of “same-sex
marriage.”
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND PARENTAL RIGHTS
As is traditional in modern substantive due process cases, the
Lawrence Court begins16 with Meyer v. Nebraska17 and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters.18 These cases are cited for their “broad statements of the
substantive reach of liberty under the Due Process Clause.”19
But the statements of the substantive reach of Due Process liberty in
these cases are not especially broad. We may begin with Meyer. This
decision upheld the right of a teacher to practice his profession (one that
“always has been regarded as useful and honorable”20), against a statute
that banned the teaching of foreign languages to grade-school students.
In so doing, the Court also laid down some strong dicta21about parental
rights and obligations, and about how the “letter and spirit of the
Constitution”22 support traditional family life in preference to Spartan

attributes of personhood were they formed under the compulsion of the State.” Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
15. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. See also Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472,
2489 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that if the Casey “mystery passage” is
applied to actions, such that all actions based on one’s “concept of existence” are constitutionally
protected, then “it is the passage that ate the rule of law.” Every imaginable law governing conduct
could impinge in some way on someone’s “concept of existence, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life.” Id.
16. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476.
17. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
18. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
19. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476.
20. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
21. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390, 399 (In a non-exclusive list of rights said to be protected by 14th
Amendment Due Process, the Meyer Court listed the right “to marry, to establish a home and bring
up children. . . .” 262 U.S. 390, 399). Additionally, the Court states, “Corresponding to the natural
right [of parents in education], it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education
suitable to their station in life, and nearly all the state, including Nebraska, enforce this obligation by
compulsory laws.” Id. at 400.
22. Id. at 402.
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regimentation or Plato’s proposal for communization of family life in
THE REPUBLIC.23
Meyer does indeed contain a list of Fourteenth Amendment-based
rights that is both long and syntactically open-ended; yet it is necessary
to do more than count the rights and note open-endedness in order to take
the Court’s point. The list is not arbitrary or without internal cohesion.
Neither, therefore, is it truly open-ended.24 The Court’s admittedly nonexhaustive list of substantive due process rights contains the rights:
[T]o contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.25

This list of rights is not a charter for prometheanism or
bohemianism. Rather, it is a celebration of the ordinary. Specifically, this
list portrays the average virtuous male citizen of middle America, who
gets a job or starts a business, gets an education (presumably before
starting the business, but no matter), gets married, has children, and takes
them to church. Generally, these rights are all directed at the normal and
the familiar, not the experimental or the progressive: “common
occupations,” “long recognized at common law,”26 “orderly pursuit.”
These are not terms by which a court claims to know “certain truths” to
which the constitutional framers were “blind.”27 On the contrary, they are
23. Id. at 401-402; cf. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Book V. I think it’s plain that the Court’s
rejection of the Platonic/Spartan scheme is an affirmation of the alternative which that scheme aimed
to replace, namely, the family. Even if this is debatable as an interpretation of The Republic, I
nonetheless think it’s plain as a pikestaff as an interpretation of Pierce, unless we attribute to Justice
McReynolds a degree of Socratic sophistication that he his not ordinarily thought to have possessed.
24. The “list” is the Court’s attempt in Meyer to give content to substantive due process. I
call it open-ended simply because (just like the list of “privileges and immunities” in Corfield v.
Coryell) the Court explicitly declares the list to be incomplete and consisting of examples only
25. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
26. Justice Scalia calls attention to this limitation in Meyer in his Lawrence dissent,
italicizing the words “long recognized at common law,” and thus scoring the Court for failing to take
account of this aspect of Meyer. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2492 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
27. Id. at 2484. The contrast here is between the rights-recognizing role assumed by the
Meyer Court, which is deferential toward actually-existing social structures, and the rightsrecognizing (some would say, rights-creating) rule assumed by the Lawrence Court, which explicitly
takes on itself the right/duty of recognizing rights that not only do not actually exist (sodomy is not a
pillar of society the way, say, child-rearing and business entrepreneurship are) but which have
actually been consistently rejected in Common Law history (as Bowers demonstrated). The Meyer
Court lists rights with a respectful attitude toward the received opinion of its time, with an eye to
preventing legislative interference with bourgeois structures. The Lawrence Court announces rights
with a contemptuous attitude toward the received opinions of our times, with an eye to building a
judicially authorized sexual utopia.
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terms by which a court, even while claiming an extensive power of
judicial review,28 nonetheless humbly subjects that power to a tradition
that it did not create and cannot ignore or disparage.
In Pierce, two years after Meyer, the Court made the parental-rights
aspect of Meyer more explicit, striking down an Oregon state
constitutional amendment that required all school-age students to attend
public schools, effectively banning private and religious ones.29 Pierce
provides no more support than Meyer for a doctrine of ever-expanding
liberty in personal matters. To the contrary, it described the private
schools that were the actual plaintiffs in the case as “a kind of
undertaking not inherently harmful, but long regarded as useful and
meritorious.”30 The liberty that the decision protected was not a
contourless “personal and private life of the individual,” but specifically
“the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control.”31 A liberty that, while
extensive, must be balanced against certain unquestioned state powers,
including “the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to
inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils, to
require . . . that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must
be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the
public welfare.”32
Pierce does in fact contain a broad dictum about “[t]he fundamental
theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose,”33 but
what it excludes is not a power to illegalize conduct long viewed as
sinful and against nature, but a power to “standardize children.”34 If we
want to flesh out that “fundamental theory,” we will have to go to

28. Interestingly, Justice Scalia is prominent among those who think Meyer and its progeny
were cases of judicial overreaching. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 92 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). See also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 95-96 in which Justice Scalia states:
Pierce and Meyer, had they been decided in recent times, may well have been grounded
upon First Amendment principles protecting freedom of speech, belief, and religion.
Their formulation and subsequent interpretation have been quite different, of course; and
they long have been interpreted to have found in Fourteenth Amendment concepts of
liberty an independent right of the parent in the “custody, care and nurture of the child,”
free from state intervention. The principle exists, then, in broad formulation; yet courts
must use considerable restraint, including careful adherence to the incremental instruction
given by the precise facts of particular cases, as they seek to give further and more
precise definition to the right.
Id. at 95-96.
29. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
30. Pierce at 534 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 534-35.
32. Id. at 535.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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sources outside of Pierce, because all we learn about it in Pierce is that it
“excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.”35 Thus,
under Pierce, there is (for example) not the slightest doubt about the
right of a gay citizen who has legal custody of a child to choose nonpublic schools for that child. But to cite Pierce as authority for other
aspects of that citizen’s lifestyle, aspects that were considered crimes36 in
the era when choosing a school for one’s child was (as it still is)
considered a right, is to take the notions of evolving tradition and
developing doctrine beyond any limit where one can still claim to be
working within that tradition.
III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
After expansively interpreting cases establishing parental rights, the
Court took a similar approach to cases establishing an individual’s right
to decide when to become a parent. The Court began its analysis with
Griswold v. Connecticut as the “most pertinent beginning.”37
While the Lawrence Court accurately characterizes Griswold as
having “placed emphasis on the marriage relation and the protected space
of the marital bedroom,”38 it overlooks the strenuous effort made by
Justice Douglas in that opinion to distance the Court from any revival of
Due Process based “fundamental rights” jurisprudence.39 But since this is
hardly the first time the post-Griswold Court has done this (was Justice

35. Id. It is not so much what the Pierce Court is saying but it is what the it does not say. The
Court denies a general power in the state to standardize children. Later, in Skinner, it was interpreted
as meaning a right to procreate—but Pierce did not include that holding. Still later, in Griswold, it
was interpreted as meaning a general right of family privacy that in turn implies a right to use
contraceptives—but Pierce also did not include that holding. Most astonishingly, Pierce is part of
the string-cite in Roe—but, needless to say, Pierce did not include abortion. Educating your children
has nothing to do with abortion. Pierce has been ventriloquized into “holding” a lot of things that it
never said, and which the Court that decided would probably (though I can’t prove this) have viewed
with horror.
36. “There are 203 prosecutions for consensual, adult homosexual sodomy reported in the
West Reporting system and official state reporters from the years 1880-1995.” Lawrence, 123 S. Ct.
at 2494 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE
APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 375 (1999)).
37. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. at 2476.
38. Id. at 2477.
39. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-482 (1965). The author intends to make the
point that the cases from Griswold to Lawrence have proceed by picking up on cultural hints in these
cases, rather than by reliance on holding or dicta. For example, Griswold created a right to
contraceptive use by married couples—but was read in Eisenstadt as having created a general right
to contraception. Eisenstadt, in turn, did not (quite) hold that minors are entitled to all the sexual
rights of adults, but it was reading Carey as though it had. Furthermore, Griswold, Eisenstadt,
Carey, and the abortion cases all have to do with procreation, or the avoidance thereof, but Lawrence
generalizes this to intimate relations in general.
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Douglas really trying all that hard to avoid letting Lochner v. New York40
“be our guide”?41). Lawrence next examined Eisenstadt v. Baird,42 Carey
v. Population Services International,43 and Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.44
These cases are more Lochnerian in their methodology than
Griswold: in classic substantive Due Process fashion, they examine the
challenged statutes’ purposes and/or classifications and then find them
not rationally related to a legitimate state objective.45 To that extent they
provide marginally more support than does Griswold for the personal
autonomy doctrine of Casey and Lawrence.
But at the level of the decisions’ actual holdings and rationales, there
turns out to be less than meets the eye. Eisenstadt, for instance, is best
known (whether for praise or blame) for its virtual equation of the
married and non-married states,46 which followed a mere seven years
upon the dicta in Griswold about marriage being “sacred”47 that held the
statute in Griswold as being uniquely offensive because of its intrusion
into “an intimate relation of husband and wife.”48 But if we ask what
right Eisenstadt actually protects, the passage just cited gives the answer.
It is not a general right of the unmarried to have all the privileges of the
married, but rather their right to strict scrutiny of a statute that intrudes
into “matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child.”49
The three cases the Eisenstadt Court then cites50 are of limited
assistance in discerning what other “matters” these may be. Skinner v.
Oklahoma, also dealt with procreation, albeit from a “right to” approach
rather than (as in Eisenstadt) a “right not to” approach.51 Stanley v.
Georgia, dealt with at-home consumption of obscenity, which the Court
40. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
41. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482
42. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
43. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
44. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
45. But see John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale
L.J. 920 (1973) (showing that Lochner, however objectionable, was a more legally disciplined
decision than Roe.).
46. 405 U.S. at 453-454. The court states, that “the rights must be the same for the unmarried
and the married alike.” Eisenstadt at 454. The court continues, “the State could not, consistently with
the Equal Protection Clause, outlaw distribution to unmarried but not to married persons.” However,
what Eisenstadt did not say was that contraception is a fundamental right, or that the “immorality of
contraception” can never be the basis for legislation. Id. at 452-454.
47. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
48. Id. at 482.
49. 405 U.S. at 453.
50. Id.
51. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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has repeatedly held to be otherwise inside the scope of First Amendment
protection as regards production or trafficking,52 hardly a beacon for the
treatment of sodomy in Lawrence.53 Finally, Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
which is remarkably inapposite, as the plaintiff there failed to convince
the Court that his religious objections exempted him from a mandatory
vaccination program.54
Judge Bork, well-known as a conservative judge, in a judicial
critique of the Supreme Court’s privacy cases, illustrated the proper
interpretation of Eisenstadt in his remarks for a panel of the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit:
In order to apply Eisenstadt to a future case not involving the same
personal decision, a court would have to know whether the challenged
governmental regulation was “unwarranted” and whether the regulation
was of a matter “so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.” Eisenstadt itself does not provide any
criteria by which either of those decisions can be made.55

Most interestingly, the Eisenstadt Court specifically raised the
question, “[M]ay [the statute] be sustained simply as a prohibition on
contraception?”56 The reader expects a big “no,” but it never arrives, at
least not from the Supreme Court itself. The opinion quotes the
underlying Court of Appeals decision that states, “To say that
contraceptives are immoral as such . . . conflicts with fundamental
human rights.”57 But on this the Supreme Court comments: “We need not
and do not, however, decide that important question in this case,”
because the Equal Protection issue (treating the married and the
unmarried differently with regard to the interest in not begetting a child)
solves the case.58
From Eisenstadt, the Court proceeds to Carey v. Population Services
International,59 finding in Carey the principle that “the reasoning of
Griswold could not be confined to the protection of the rights of married
adults.”60 But Carey made clear the exact right it was protecting:
The fatal fallacy in [the state’s] argument is that it overlooks the
underlying premise of those decisions [Griswold and Eisenstadt] that
52. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (substantially limiting Stanley).
53. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
54. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
55. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (presumably overruled by
Lawrence, but still a good read).
56. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452 (1972).
57. Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398, 1402 (1st Cir. 1970).
58. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452 (1972) (emphasis added).
59. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
60. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2477 (2003).
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the Constitution protects the right of the individual. . . to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into. . . the decision whether to
bear or beget a child. . . . Read in light of its progeny, the teaching of
Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in
matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.
...
This is so not because there is an independent fundamental right of
access to contraceptives, but because such access is essential to
exercise [sic] of the constitutionally protected right of decision in
matters of childbearing that is the underlying foundation of the
holdings in Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Roe v. Wade.61

Throughout the modern substantive due process cases from 1965 to
1992, the Court may have been hinting at a broad doctrine on personal
autonomy centering on sexual activity, but it issued no holding to that
effect. However, it did contain dicta about “a right of personal privacy,
or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy.”62 Furthermore, a
“hidden agenda” argument is always possible, especially given that the
same panel of Justices offered contradictory dicta about marriage in
Griswold63 and Eisenstadt,64 without a change in Court personnel that
would account for the difference.65

61. Carey, 431 U.S. at 687-89 (first and second ellipses in original) (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 684 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)).
63. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). (“intimate to the degree of being
sacred”).
64. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). ( “not an independent entity with a mind
and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup”).
65. Between 1965 and 1972, Chief Justice Warren was replaced by Chief Justice Burger;
Justice Goldberg was replaced first by Justice Fortas and then by Justice Blackmun, Justice Black
was replaced by Justice Powell, Justice Clark was replaced by Justice Marshall, and Justice Harlan
was replaced by Justice Rehnquist. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart and White were on the Court
throughout the period under discussion. See GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW xcvxcvii (4th ed. 2001). Together these changes would suggest no net change of heart from “right” to
“left” on the nature of marriage. The Warren-to-Burger and Harlan-to-Rehnquist changes were
arguably changes from “left” to “right,” relatively speaking. (Being new to the Court at the time,
neither Powell nor Rehnquist took part in Eisenstadt. It is doubtful that they would have changed the
outcome, as Chief Justice Burger was the only dissenter.) The Goldberg-to-Blackmun change is
about a wash in terms of moral worldviews. Justice Black, having dissented in Griswold, does not
figure in this analysis. In short, changes in Court membership cannot account for the Griswold-toEisenstadt change in the dicta on marriage. For this reason, the ode to marriage given us by the
frequently-married Justice Douglas may without grave injustice be considered more rhetorical than
candid.
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IV. PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. CASEY
Of the precedents cited by the Lawrence Court, Planned Parenthood
v. Casey is the only one it did not twist to some extent. Unlike the
abovementioned cases, Casey comes pre-twisted. Pre-twisted in the sense
that previous cases had only hinted at a doctrine of personal autonomy or
privacy included in the 14th Amendment. The question here is why
Casey, rather than the later-decided Washington v. Glucksberg,66controls.
In Glucksberg, with Casey and its “mystery passage”67decided a
mere five years earlier and presumably still good law, the Court
nonetheless reaffirmed its pre-Casey due process methodology of
cleaving closely to “our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and
practices.”68 Referring particularly to the “mystery passage,” the
Glucksberg Court glossed it as no more than a restatement of the historyand-tradition approach, and concluded: “That many of the rights and
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal
autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all
important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected, and Casey
did not suggest otherwise.”69
Whether Casey did or did not suggest otherwise is open to debate;70
the Glucksberg opinion does, after all, give us primarily the Casey
dissenters’ take on what Casey means.71 But as a matter of precedent, the
Lawrence Court might have been expected to deal with Glucksberg in
some way as significant intervening case law, especially since it makes
much of Casey as intervening case law.72
66. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
67. See supra note 15.
68. 521 U.S. at 710.
69. Id. at 727-28 (internal citations omitted).
70. One who read the “mystery passage” broadly was Judge Reinhardt of the 9th Circuit in
his en banc opinion in Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 813-14 (1996), rev’d sub
nom, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). Opponents of Roe and Casey have voiced
similar views. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Mighty Casey at the Bat, CATHOLIC DOSSIER, May-June,
1999, http://www.catholic.net/rcc/Periodicals/Dossier/MAYJUN99/Casey.html (visited November 7,
2003).
71. The opinion for the Court in Glucksberg was written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined
by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Thus, three of the four Casey dissenters are
speaking here; the fourth, Justice White, had since retired. Justice O’Connor, a co-author of the
three-Justice controlling opinion in Casey, joins the Casey dissenters in their conservative
interpretation of Casey – and pointedly declines in Lawrence to join in the overruling of Bowers v.
Hardwick. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2485 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
That leaves only Justice Kennedy pinned in an apparent contradiction, endorsing one view in
Glucksberg (Casey merely rearticulates the history-and-tradition doctrine of modern substantive due
process) and another in Lawrence (Casey protects those who “seek autonomy” for the “purposes”
enumerated in the Casey mystery passage). Id. at 2481-82.
72. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481, arguing that Casey is one of “[t]wo principal cases decided
after Bowers [that have] cast its holding into even more doubt.” The other, the Court says, is Romer
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Yet the opinion of the Court in Lawrence contains no reference to
Glucksberg at all. The right claimed as “fundamental” in Glucksberg –
physician-assisted suicide – was found by the Court to be at odds with
centuries of common law teaching viewing suicide as a crime.73 Since
the Court in Lawrence is sure that the historical teaching of Bowers v.
Hardwick74 was wrong and that our legal tradition has treated private
consensual sodomy rather benignly,75 and did not “target[] same-sex
couples . . . until the 1970s,”76 why not make history the basis of
comparison with Glucksberg? Why not say: “Whereas suicide has been
so long viewed as a crime in our legal tradition that it cannot now be
viewed as a right, homosexuality, in contrast, was tolerated recently, and
therefore private, consensual sodomy is ‘deeply rooted in our nation’s
history and tradition’ even though physician-assisted suicide is not.” In
other words, if the Court is sure that Glucksberg has historical support
while Bowers does not, why not say so? Does the court really think so?77
V. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
The remaining issue is the relevance of Lawrence to the issue of
same-sex marriage. But as the Lawrence Court’s non-treatment of
Glucksberg demonstrates, this is impossible to predict. I agree with both
Justice Scalia78 that, on the one hand, after Lawrence, there is no
principled reason for the Court to decline to hold that the Constitution
requires that marriage licenses be issued to all who demand them,
regardless of sex or orientation. But the Court is not above ignoring
applicable principles from its own precedents. The analogy is Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, where it adopted a broad personal autonomy

v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (finding no rational basis for a state constitutional amendment barring
enactment by state or localities of laws protecting homosexuals as such). See also Justice Scalia’s
observation: “I do not quarrel with the Court’s claim that Romer v. Evans ‘eroded’ the ‘foundations’
of Bowers’ rational-basis holding. But Roe and Casey have been equally ‘eroded’ by Washington v.
Glucksberg, which held that only fundamental rights which are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition’ qualify for anything other than rational basis scrutiny under the doctrine of
‘substantive due process.’” Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2489 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis in original).
73. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710-19.
74. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (collecting common law authorities to the effect that sodomy is a
crime).
75. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478-80.
76. Id. at 2479.
77. Alternatively, is Glucksberg merely being fattened for the kill? In the next physicianassisted suicide case, will Lawrence count as significant intervening case law “casting doubt” on
Glucksberg?
78. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling the Court “manipulative” in
its application of stare decisis).
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doctrine, and Washington v. Glucksberg, where, asked to apply that
doctrine to assisted suicide, it declined, with very little explanation.
The Court in Lawrence left itself certain verbal escape hatches
available, if and when the issue is squarely presented. For instance, the
Court declined to read the Fourteenth Amendment as requiring state
recognition of same-sex marriage. “The [challenged] statutes,” the Court
writes, “do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not
entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons
to choose without being punished as criminals.”79 The italicized passage
gives the Court complete flexibility in the future to find that Lawrence
implicitly recognized a right to same-sex marriage, or that it implicitly
declined to do so.
In the next paragraph, the Court criticizes “attempts by the State, or a
court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries
absent injury to a person . . .,”80 One might ask, doesn’t the entire corpus
of marriage law both “define the meaning of a relationship” to a
considerable extent, and also, “set its boundaries” to a considerable
extent? Read on:—”or abuse of an institution the law protects.”81 Does
the Court have any particular “institution” in mind? No institution other
than marriage fits the context. What other “institution” is relevant to a
discussion of the limits of government’s power to regulate intimate
associations? Adoption, perhaps; but marriage still fits the context best.
Obviously, the Court is hinting that states may, even after Lawrence,
“protect”82 marriage – meaning, presumably, marriage as it was
understood before and until Lawrence itself.
If the Court, in a future case, does not wish to go as far as a
constitutional right to same-sex marriage, the aforementioned passages
will be more than enough to make the case that Lawrence does not
require it to do so. On the other hand, in other dicta, the Court lays a
foundation in the other direction: “[O]ur laws and traditions in the past
half century . . . show an emerging awareness that liberty gives
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their
private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”83 If the Court were to decide
that the time had come to announce a constitutional right to same-sex
79. 123 S. Ct. at 2478 (emphasis added).
80. Id.
81. Id. The Court, through this language, is trying to have it both ways. It is putting severe
limits on the ability of states to set boundaries to intimate relationships, as governments have done
for centuries; yet it seems to want to carve out an exception safe-harbor for what it calls “an
institution that the law protects”—and which, evidently, the law can (at least for now) continue to
protect.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2480.
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marriage, this dictum and the holding of Lawrence that “demean[ing]”
the “existence” of homosexual persons is an impermissible legislative
effect84 (regardless of legislative intent) would likewise give the Court all
the precedential paperweights it would need.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ever since Griswold, which verbally reaffirmed the death of
substantive due process while actually re-inaugurating it in a new form,
the Court’s substantive due process cases mostly have been exercises in
narrow holdings followed by broad interpretations of those holdings in
later cases. One case’s hints become the next case’s holdings. In this
regard, if in no other way, Lawrence is indisputably part of a tradition,
even if one only 38 years old.

84. Id. at 2484. This is the closest thing to a legal holding that I can find in Lawrence.
Significantly, as Justice Scalia repeatedly observes in his dissent, the Court nowhere holds that
sodomy is, in fact, a constitutional right. 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[N]owhere does
the Court’s opinion declare that homosexual sodomy is a ‘fundamental right’ under the Due Process
Clause”); id. at 2492 (“The Court today does not overrule this holding [of Bowers]. Not once does it
describe homosexual sodomy as a ‘fundamental right’ or a ‘fundamental liberty interest’. . . .”).

